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Pesquisas  empíricas  baseadas  em  modelos  de  agente  representativo  assumem  que  os  dados  de  certas 
categorias de consumo agregado são consistentes com uma função utilidade estável e bem comportada. Tal 
hipótese – quase sempre presumida verdadeira, sem verificação – pode, todavia, ser testada. Este artigo se 
dedica a investigar o poder do teste do Axioma Geral de Preferência Revelada (GARP), desenvolvido por 
Hal Varian, naquela que parece ser a base de dados mais comumente presumida consistente com funções 
de utilidade bem comportadas em toda a pesquisa empírica: os gastos de consumo não-durável americano 
no  período  do  pós-guerra.  Uma  análise  detalhada  dos  métodos  previamente  empregados  para  simular 
comportamento irracional – e, conseqüentemente, para se determinar o poder do teste numa determinada 
base de dados – indica que eles falham sob condições nada atípicas. Assim, os algoritmos existentes são 
reconsiderados e modificados para se evitar conclusões tendenciosas sobre o poder do teste. Os resultados 
sugerem que o algorítmo modificado é menos suscetível a gerar estimativas viesadas do poder do teste nos 
agregados tipicamente utilizados, mas documentam uma vez mais o baixo poder do teste em dados anuais, 
relativamente ao observado em séries trimestrais. 
 
Abstract: 
Empirical  research  based  on  representative-agent  models  often  assumes  that  subsets  of  aggregate 
consumption data are consistent with some stable, well-behaved utility function. Such strong and mostly 
“maintained”  assumption  can,  nevertheless,  be  put  to  test.  This  paper  investigates  the  power  of  Hal 
Varian's General Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) Test in what seems to be the dataset most widely 
admitted consistent with simple utility functions in all empirical consumption research: the U.S. postwar 
personal consumption expenditures data on nondurables and services. A careful analysis of methods to 
simulate irrational behavior and, therefore, to determine the power of the test in a specific dataset indicates 
that they ultimately fail to do so under quite typical circumstances. Existing algorithm are reconsidered and 
subsequently modified to avoid biased conclusions about the power of the test, especially in low frequency 
data. Results suggest that our modified algorithm is indeed less likely to generate biased estimates of the 
power of the test in most of the previously studied subsets of data, but also confirm that the power of the 
GARP-test is significantly lower within annual series than in quarterly ones. 
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1-Introduction 
 
Aggregation both along time and across goods are commonly regarded as maintained assumptions in 
empirical  studies  of  macroeconomic  consumption.  For  more  than  twenty  years
1,  though,  Varian’s 
(1982,  1983)  nonparametric  tests  of  revealed  preferences  have  been  applied  to  consumption 
expenditure data as a way to reduce the arbitrariness of choices concerning aggregation across goods in 
empirical studies (Choi et al., 2007). This paper revisits and builds upon methods previously applied to 
verify the power of the GARP test
2 in actual datasets – that is, the likelihood of committing a “type II” 
error and accept the utility maximizing hypothesis when it is false.  
 
As GARP-consistency and weak separability tests are run on presumably separable subcategories of 
consumption expenditures, the existence of a well-behaved
3 macro utility function rationalizing those 
figures  may  be  rejected  (Varian,,1982).  But  if  a  set  of  aggregates  passes  both  tests,  empirical 
researchers  can  justifiably  set  out  maximization  models  for  those  goods  –  conditional  on  total 
expenditure  in  those  categories  –  and  save  degrees  of  freedom  in  the  estimation  of  preference 
parameters  from  usual  optimality  conditions  (Swofford  and  Whitney,  1987;  1994;  Drake,  1997; 
Fleissig, Hall and Seater, 2000; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Blundell, Browning and Crawford, 2003). 
 
Due  to  the  nonparametric  nature  of  the  GARP  test,  researchers  must  be  aware  that  two  extreme 
outcomes may occur: first, the test can reject the existence of a well-behaved representative utility 
function rationalizing long series of data (H0) due to a single deviation from the expected maximizing 
behavior – which suggests that significant measurement errors could frequently lead to rejection of the 
null hypothesis (Jones and Peretti, 2005; Elger and Jones, 2008). Secondly, the test is likely to have 
low power in datasets where budget hyperplane intersections are infrequent. This second possibility is 
the  one  of  most  concern  here,  for  it  can  arise  in  a  fairly  common  circumstance:  the  use  of  low 
frequency data (annual figures) in periods of economic expansion. Therefore, temporal aggregation 
plays a role in one’s assessment of the validity of a particular aggregation across goods.  
 
Bronars’(1987) Monte Carlo experiment generated random budget shares to find that the test was more 
likely to commit a type II error in observed annual-budget hyperplanes than in quarterly ones. Since 
then, different approaches to generate the alternative hypothesis (irrational behavior) were developed. 
In the next sections, we will review those procedures, propose a modified algorithm, and observe which 
ones are more likely to under/overestimate the power of the GARP-test in quarterly and annual series 
of  U.S.  consumption  expenditure  data.  As  we  do  so,  we  argue  that  some  of  the  algorithms  are 
especially susceptible to failure, i.e., generating data quite consistent with rational behavior. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized in four additional sections.  First, we review the relevant tools 
of  revealed  preference  analysis  and  the  methods  to  assess  the  power  of  the  GARP-test  in  actual 
datasets.  In  section  3  we  provide  a  brief  description  of  data  sources  and  manipulations,  before 
considering  the  evolution  of  budget  shares  along  the  studied  sample.  Next  we  simulate  data  with 
different algorithms and run the GARP-test in both actual and constructed series. Final remarks, overall 
conclusions and a direction for future research are presented in the last section (5). 
                                                 
1The whole literature on Consumption-Based Asset Pricing Models, for example, have traditionally assumed – without 
testing – the existence of well-behaved utility functions rationalizing choices on either nondurable goods alone or the sum 
of nondurable goods and services, in investigations of intertemporal substitution and risk aversion; see Hansen & Singleton 
(1982), Stock & Wright (2000). See also Choi et al. (2007) for a new “toolkit” to the application of Varian’s method.   
2GARP stands for General Axiom of Revealed Preference; concepts and tests are discussed in the next section of the paper. 
3For “well-behaved” utility function we mean one that is monotonically increasing, semi-concave and twice-differentiable.    3 
2-Varian’s tools of revealed preference analysis and their power 
 
2.1-Garp and weak separability tests: a brief review 
Consider a standard utility-maximizing consumer that chooses a vector of goods x, facing a vector of 
corresponding prices p and total income m – superscripts denoting specific observations. Let p
t be the 
vector of current prices when a choice x
t is made; we say that x
t is directly revealed preferred to an 
alternative x
s if and only if x
t is purchased when x
s is also affordable:  
 
 











Intuitively, we cannot say that x
t is revealed-preferred to any other bundle that was not affordable when 
the choice was made. Two extensions to this basic relation are relevant. First, one can define Strict 
Revealed Preference Relation (R
S) in the same lines as DRP, but changing the inequality signal to “>” 
(strictly greater than). Additionally, we label the revealed preference relation R as the transitive closure 
of the relation R
D; that is, x
tRx
















Assume now that x
t is directly revealed preferred to x
s, as in our definition of DRP; also, as goods are 
sold  later  at  a  new  set  of  prices,  p
s,  x
s  is  chosen;  this  behavior  is  not  consistent  with  the  utility 
maximization model if, at the new prices p
s, x
s turns out to be chosen and x
t is also affordable. Thus, if 
x
s and x
t were affordable at both occasions, the consumer should have made the same pick. Therefore, 
the pair of observed choices is only consistent with the maximization model if x
t is not affordable later, 
as x






s at current prices p
t but x
s is chosen at a different set of prices p
s,  









The  definition  above  contains  all  important  elements  of  Varian’s  (1982,  1983) nonparametric  test, 
which  simply  verifies  the  occurrence  of  GARP  violations  in  a  series  of  consumption  choices. 
Equivalently,  one  can  say  that  the  test  verifies  whether  the  consumer’s  preference  over  a  set  of 
observed choices remains the same over time.  
 
As for the nonparametric test of weak separability, which requires GARP-consistency as a necessary 
condition, it was also originally developed and implemented by Varian (1983). As before, one can 
avoid  restating  theorems  and  proofs,  but  it  is  useful  to  define  and  illustrate  weakly 
separable/nonseparable  preferences  before  we  further  discuss  the  test  and  distinguish  between 
necessary and sufficient conditions of the test. 
 
Following Fleissig, Hall and Seater (2000), suppose that a vector of k goods is partitioned into two 
subsets, a and b, where a=(x1, x2,…,xm) and b=(xm+1, xm+2…,xk); a utility function U(x) is weakly 
separable in b-goods if there exist a subutility function v(b) and a macro function u*[a,v(b)] which is   4 
continuous and monotonically strictly increasing in v(b), such that U(a,b)≡ u*[a,v(b)]. Two facts must 
be remembered: first, if a utility function is weakly separable in b goods, it means that the marginal rate 
of substitution between any two of those goods is independent of the “a” goods; second, separability in 
“b” goods does not imply separability in “a” goods
4.  
 
The most common functional forms defining preferences in economics are weakly separable, including 
the Cobb-Douglas and the CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) specifications. Blackorby et al. 
(1998) provide the following example of nonseparable functional format, which was later adopted in 
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Further, we can denote Ui(x) the first derivative of the utility function U(x) with respect to commodity 
“i" and use tedious algebra to show that  0
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 ; in 
words,  the  marginal  rate  of  substitution  between  x3  and  x4  does  not  depend  on  the  levels  of 
consumption of goods outside that “branch”, whereas the same cannot be said about x1 and x2. The 
function is weakly separable in the goods x3 and x4 but not in x1 and x2.  
 
A necessary condition for weak separability is that the supposedly separable subset of data must pass 
the GARP-consistency test, due to the fact that it could reject the existence of a well-behaved subutility 
function v(.). Sufficiency is achieved if there are numbers satisfying a series of inequalities – known as 
Afriat inequalities – involving prices, quantities and expenditures on each supposedly separable subset 
of goods (Varian, 1983). Fleissig and Whitney (2003) developed a relatively efficient algorithm to 
search for those numbers, which starts from superlative group indexes and searches for the smallest 
necessary  deviations  from  them  (if  any)  so  that  Afriat  inequalities  are  satisfied.  The  authors  were 
motivated  by  results  such  as  Barnett  and  Choi’s  (1989),  which  reported  having  used  Varian’s 
NONPAR software and failed to obtain sufficiency in simulated Cobb-Douglas data. The advantages of 
this algorithm are the fact that it can be implemented in PC’s – with relatively low computational costs, 
if compared to the use of supercomputers in Swofford and Whitney (1994)
5. 
 
In practice, as one investigates alternative separability structures, the results indicate which of them 
pass the tests for necessary, necessary and sufficient or none of the conditions. If a disaggregated set of 
goods  passes  both  conditions  for  weak  separability  in  a  representative  utility  function,  their  later 
consolidation (aggregation) in the empirical analyses of alternative aggregator functions is not only 
                                                 
4 See Pollak (1971) for a good discussion on separability concepts and their main implications. 
5 The majority of previous results in the literature relied on Varian’s software, either in its PASCAL parallel-computing 
version or in the one for PC’s – which limits the numbers of goods/observations. Building upon Anan Usur’s (Cornell 
University)  MATLAB  codes  to  test  GARP,  we  implemented  all  tests  for  this  research  project  in  that  programming 
environment – codes available upon request. To solve the nontrivial linear programming problem involved in Fleissig and 
Whitney’s (2003), MATLAB’s built-in algorithm is very inefficient, and we had to use MOSEK’s toolbox (student version), 
which is accessed from MATLAB.   5 
convenient, but actually a theoretically valid procedure. Passing none of them, on the other hand, leads 
to a conclusive rejection of some separability structure. However, passing the necessary condition only 
means that the algorithm used to search for numbers satisfying the aforementioned inequalities failed to 
find them. The result is inconclusive because the existence of such numbers is not definitely rejected. 
   
2.2-Bronars’(1987) approach and  the power of the test 
Bronars’ simulation approach was proposed to address particularly the expansion of budget sets over 
time due to recurrent positive income shifts in actual data. He conditioned the acceptance of the GARP 
test results to a more careful examination of the data; as observed choices can only be considered 
“revealed  preferred”  to  feasible  alternatives,  no  GARP  violation  can  occur  if  at  each  period  the 
consumer can purchase all affordable bundles of previous moments. 
 
The method is rather appealing; it essentially involves simulating random budget share allocations 
along the observed budget hyperplanes, which can be trivially deduced from datasets of actual prices 
and quantities. By doing so, it incorporates Becker’s (1962) notion of irrational (random) behavior as 
the true alternative hypothesis and evaluates how often the test is able to reject its null hypothesis of 
GARP consistency in randomly simulated data. If the series with actual choices pass GARP and the 
simulated ones fail to do so reasonably often, evidence suggests that the nonrejection of the actual 
choices was not due to the absence of budget intersections; the consumer actually seems to behave as 
an utility maximizer with a stable ordering of preferences for alternative combinations of goods. The 
power of the test against the alternative hypothesis in a specific dataset is measured as the percentage 




Two algorithms used by Bronars to generate random points along observed budget hyperplanes are of 
particular interest here. For n commodities and t periods, the first algorithm involves drawing random 
variables  Z1t,…,  Znt  from  a  uniform  distribution  so  that  random  budget  shares  Sit  allocated  to  the 
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The sum of Sit for all n goods is 1, meaning that even an “irrational” consumer is expected to exhaust 
the income available at each time by picking random points along – and never below – the observed 
budget lines. In other words, his irrationality actually involves spending all his income randomly, on 
the available goods. Having simulated the series on budget shares, real expenditures on each good are 
calculated by multiplying those shares by total expenditures, and the resulting figures are divided by 
actual prices (price indices) of the corresponding commodities. The final numbers constitute proxies of 
real quantities demanded by an irrational consumer.  
 
                                                 
6  Also  central  to  Bronars’  discussion  was  that  the  nature  and  the  frequency  of  budget  line  intersections  would  differ 
significantly if the researcher adopted aggregate or per capita consumption figures as the baseline for those simulations; his 
empirical finding – consistent with such explanation – was that the power of the test was much higher in per capita datasets 
than with aggregate series. 
7 The algorithms referred here as “first” and “second” are actually Bronars’(1987) second and third, as he also considered a 
simpler one, with random numbers being drawn from the uniform distribution.        6 
One can expect that testing GARP-consistency of purely random allocations of resources leads mostly 
to rejections of the hypothesis of utility maximization but that is not necessarily true, especially if the 
actual budget lines shift significantly over time; if budget lines do not intersect in the actual dataset, 
they will not intersect in randomly simulated series. GARP violations will never occur in either case.  
 
The algorithm above implies an expected budget share of 1/n for each commodity, and also that actual 
purchases of some goods typically represent larger shares of total expenditures than others. For reasons 
that will be discussed subsequently, he proposed another method to generate random figures but this 
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where Ki is the mean budget share of good i in the actual data across all years. Generated like this, the 
simulated budget shares for each good will randomly fluctuate around their historical (sample) average.   
 
Bronars  justified  the  use  of  both  algorithms  above  stating  that  they  make  unlikely  the  picking  of 
bundles near intercepts by the irrational consumer; the expected budget share simulated for any good 
with the first algorithm is 1/n (n being the number of goods), whereas with the second method the 
expected  budget  share  is  simply  the  historical  average  share  allocated  for  that  good.  In  any  case, 
however, the algorithms are unlikely to simulate budget allocations that result in most of the income 
being  spent,  by  chance,  on  a  single  good.  He  claims  that  such  a  fact  matters  because  budget 
intersections in post-war U.S. consumption data occurred mostly near intercepts; consequently, the use 
of his algorithms would prevent an overestimation of the power of the test in his dataset.  
 
2.3-Extensions of the original approach 
The core of Bronars’ power measure for the GARP test is the definition of an alternative assumption, 
hereafter also referred to as the “irrationality” model. Data are generated with criteria other than the 
maximization of well-behaved utility functions, so that one can evaluate how often the test is able to 
distinguish between rational and irrational choices, all leading to the same observed expenditure. That 
is also the source of its most notorious shortcoming: conclusions from the application of such method 
are sensitive to the particulars of the budget-share simulating algorithm.  
 
Unless the test is shown to have high power in a dataset with the adoption of multiple irrationality 
models, it may be hard to establish how truly strong is the evidence of utility-maximizing behavior 
coming from the GARP-consistency of a dataset. Let’s consider a couple of alternative algorithms 
proposed in the literature as extensions to Bronars’. Later, we will suggest a new one, which may have 
advantages in replicating relevant characteristics of actual data.    
 
Recall Bronars’ second algorithm Sit(2), in which consumption choices are still random but the mean 
budget share of simulated data equals the historical average figure for some data sample. Unless actual 
series on budget shares behave as stationary processes in finite samples
8, the allocation of resources on 
consumption subcategories are expected to change over time, not returning to an overall average value.  
                                                 
8Hamilton (1990) defines a time series process as stationary if neither its mean nor its autocovariance depend on the date; 
intuitively, such process tends to return to an overall average value after transitory fluctuations fade away. We will return to 
this issue in a coming subsection.     7 
 
Bronars’ algorithm based on the mean budget shares seems to incorporate, in that case, a somewhat 
irrelevant  characteristic  of  the  original  choices  into  simulated  figures.  What  is  more  concerning, 
however, is that since the series on simulated budget shares are built to fluctuate around a fixed value, 
they can end up revealing rational behavior, rather than otherwise: the corresponding simulated choices 
are (likely) similar to those for weakly separable goods derived from a Cobb-Douglas utility function
9.  
 
GARP violations would even tend to disappear, if the simulated choices contained only relatively small 
budget share fluctuations around the overall averages. Of course, that  possibility is unlikely if the 
studied dataset is long and, consequently, the chance of drawing only random figures that differ little 
from the overall expected value is very small. In any case, the weakness of Bronars’ second simulating 
algorithm  is  evident:  it  can  fail  to  generate  irrational  behavior,  especially  when  applied  to  small 
samples.  The  GARP  test  may  (correctly!)  not  reject  the  supposedly  irrational  choices,  leading  the 
researcher to conclude that the power of the test is low in the studied dataset… which may not be true. 
 
Generating random but GARP-consistent choices and, for that reason, underestimating the power of the 
test in a dataset is also possible – and for the same reasons mentioned above – if one adopts two other 
proposed algorithms, that we discuss next. 
 
Burton (1994) applied and extended the original approach in the analysis of British meat and fish 
consumption data. He actually used Bronars’ data simulation methods, besides one of his own: he 
generated  uniformly  distributed  budget  share  allocations  along  the  ranges  of  historically  observed 
choices, i.e., in bounded regions of the consumer’s hyperplane. Let Wit be a random variable drawn 
from  the  uniform  distribution  U[mini,  maxi],  where  mini  and  maxi  are  the  extreme  budget  share 
historically allocated to some good i, respectively; then: 
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Notice that whenever the sum of simulated budget shares for the first (n-1) goods exceeds one, or if the 
residual budget share for the n
th good is outside the interval of actually observed choices, all numbers 
are dropped and new draws are made. This algorithm was proposed as an improvement of Bronars’s 
methods, for it avoids simulated budget allocations that are highly untypical of actual data. The same 
way  Bronars  wanted  to  avoid  overestimating  the  power  of  the  test  by  making  the  simulation  of 
“extreme” budget share allocations less likely, Burton (1994) felt that the bar could be raised some 
more: the test would only be considered strong enough if it could actually detect GARP inconsistencies 
in random choices that involve budget share allocations very similar to the observed ones. 
 
Cox (1997) proposed another alternative hypothesis to introduce “irrationality” through randomness 
but preserving characteristics of real data. He opted for the reassignment of observed budget-share 
figures randomly throughout a sample; actual budget shares observed at some period t would be used as 
the “simulated” budget share for period t+r. These “random” budget allocations are consistent with 
                                                 
9It is well-know that Cobb-Douglas demand data imply fixed budget share allocations for each good.     8 
actual  observed  choices  to  some  degree,  but  they  are  clearly  independent  of  relative  prices,  by 
construction. Hereafter we will refer to Cox’s irrationality model as the fourth (model 4), and the 
corresponding simulated budget shares as Sit(4). 
 
Cox himself observed that the GARP test would likely fail to reject his random (simulated) data if the 
true budget shares allocated to the consumption of some/all of the goods were to fluctuate little around 
fixed values throughout the sample. As before, it would lead to biased conclusions about the power of 
the test. Concerns of this nature suggest that the actual evolution of budget shares should be considered 
previously to the application of method of power assessment. It also motivates the construction of an 
algorithm that incorporates observed trends in budget shares, as we do next.  
 
 
2.4-A new simulation algorithm: incorporating consumption trends 
A straightforward adjustment to Bronars’ second algorithm [Sit(2)] permits incorporating consumption 
trends into the simulated series. It simply involves replacing the historical average budget shares across 
all years (Ki) in expression (2) with moving averages (Lit) of observed budget shares across some range 
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where Lit corresponds to the mean budget share of good i in the actual data over the arbitrary interval 
[t-τ, t+τ]. Generating random fluctuations around a moving average of actual figures can accomplish 
two  goals:  it  maintain  the  randomness  of  choices  without  systematically  imposing  any  atypical 
evolution of budget shares throughout the sample. 
 
This new algorithm [Sit(5)] permits investigating the power of GARP test against a slightly changed 
alternative hypothesis: the consumer still chooses random points along their budget hyperplanes, but in 
such a way that the simulated budget shares tend to evolve similarly to the actual figures over time. 
Rather than using the overall historical average as the parameter from which simulated budget shares 
would randomly deviate at each period, we arbitrarily pick the mean budget share of, say, 5 periods 
over the local interval [t-2,t+2]. Four observations end up being lost (at the beginning and in the end of 
the  simulated  series),  but  we  may  gain  in  the  sense  that  these  simulated  data  do  not  deviate 





3.1-Main sources and methods  
The two main sources of data used here are BEA’s NIPA (National Income and Product Accounts) and 
Fixed Assets tables, for seasonally adjusted personal consumption expenditures and the depreciation / 
stock of consumer durables, respectively. Both quarterly and annual data were collected for the period 
from 1964 to 2000
10.  
 
                                                 
10 The most relevant limitations came from labor data, with required series being available starting in 1964. Therefore, 
whenever we run test on datasets that do not consider leisure choices, the actual sample period was 1959-2000.   9 
Following once more Fleissig, Hall and Seater (2000), we adopted not the major categories of real 
personal expenditures but their components: a set of 14 subcategories of consumption expenditures, 
besides leisure: 
 
Durables, 3 components:   (D1) Motor vehicles and parts,  
(D2) furniture and household equipment and  
(D3) other durables;             
                                    
Nondurables, 5 components:  (ND1) Food, (ND2) clothing and shoes, (ND3) gasoline and 
oil, (ND4) fuel oil and coal and (ND5) other nondurables; 
 
Services, 6 components:   (S1)Housing, (S2)household operations, (S3) transportation, 
(S4) medical care, (S5) recreation and (S6) other services.  
 
As for leisure prices and quantities, we essentially followed the procedures in Swofford and Whitney 
(1987) and assumed a 10-hour daily fixed allocation of time for sleeping and eating. In fact, Swofford 
and Whitney (1988, 1994), Drake (1997) and Drake et al. (2003) adopted the same fixed amount of 
nonmarket hours per day; Mankiw et al. (1985) also assumed a daily fixed amount of time (only 8 
hours, though) allocated neither to work nor leisure. Leisure time (quantity) is residual, as one subtracts 
the average number of hours actually worked from the daily 14 hours available. The opportunity cost of 
time is proxied by  the  wage  rate – seasonally-adjusted average hourly earnings of nonsupervisory 
workers on private nonfarm payrolls. All labor data provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
11. 
 
Also in the case of durables we adopted standard procedures in this literature: consumers are assumed 
to obtain utility from services that are proportional to the stocks of durables they hold; the price of 
those services is calculate as the user cost of holding those assets over each period
12:  
 
uct   =   pt   -    [ (1-δt) / (1+Rt ) ]  .  Et ( pt+1 )             (6) 
 
where uct is the user cost of holding a stock of durable for the period t, δt is the depreciation rate, Rt is 
the nominal interest rate and pt is the price of new durables. Two benchmark expectation models were 




Worth mentioning, we deliberately avoided the use of GARP and weak separability tests on monthly 
data because those are particularly subject to measurement problems; Wilcox(1992) pointed out two 
                                                 
11 The particular series was identified in the BLS website with the code/number EES00500006. The following description is 
extracted from BLS’s Handbook of Methods (also available online): “Average hourly earnings series, derived by dividing 
gross payrolls by total hours, reflect the actual earnings of workers, including premium pay. They differ from wage rates, 
which are the amounts stipulated for a given unit of work or time. Average hourly earnings do not represent total labor costs 
per hour for the employer, because they exclude retroactive payments and irregular bonuses, employee benefits, and the 
employer’s share of payroll taxes. Earnings for those employees not included in the production worker or nonsupervisory 
categories are not reflected in the estimates.” 
12 Both Swofford and Whitney (1987, 1988) and Fleissig, Hall and Seater (2000) follow Diewert (1974) in the adequacy of 
calculating  user  costs  rather  than  using  prices  of  new  durables  for  this  matter.  See  Fleissig  (1993)  for  details  on  the 
assumptions underlying expression (6).  
13 Results were not sensitive to the choice of expectations models. We report results obtained from the dataset calculated 
assuming perfect foresight of the future price of durables held by the consumer. A spreadsheet with all series of prices and 
quantities used in this paper will be promptly made available upon request to the author.   10 
most critical sources of imperfections: (i) monthly total retail-sales figures are estimated from samples, 
therefore subject to sampling errors; and (ii) product composition of retail sales is not known at the 
monthly frequency. In fact, it is assumed that the composition of sales within each category of stores is 
fixed throughout quarters. His main conclusion was that published data – especially monthly figures – 




3.2-Evolution of budget shares 
 
Our discussion in the previous section indicates that prior knowledge about the evolution of budget 
shares in actual consumption data may help in one’s interpretation of findings from the applications of 
Bronars’ approach. Upon inspection, one can verify that many consumption subcategories seem to 
wander inside relatively narrow ranges of budget share allocations (ND4, ND5, S1, S2, S3), but others 
such  as  Food  (ND1)  and  Medical  Care  (S4)  have  clearly  shifted  over  those  years.  In  the  case  of 
Medical Care, its share rose steadily from approximately 1.5% of total expenditure to about 5.5% at the 
end of our sample. 
 
 
4-Data simulation and test results 
 
We must begin this assessment of the power of the GARP-test by stating that the actual series, at both 
frequencies, passed the test; that is, the original data contained no violation of GARP. Therefore, we 
can proceed and study how confident on such result one can be. Let’s compare – firstly – results from 
simulated  data  at  both  frequencies,  with  and  without  leisure  (as  one  of  the  relevant  consumption 
subcategories). In table 1, Q1 and A1 refer, respectively, to quarterly and annual datasets including all 
subcategories of durables, nondurables, services and leisure. The last two datasets at each frequency 
exclude leisure (Q2, A2). In each case, we generated 2000 simulated series using Bronars’ first method 
[Sit(1)] and the same number of series with his second algorithm [Sit(2)] – for starters. 
 
An important reason to check the power of the test on datasets with and without the leisure figures is 
the  fact  that  the  frequency  of  budget  intersections  could  be  significantly  affected
15.  Suppose,  for 
example, that an exogenous and large positive shock to the “price” of leisure – the opportunity cost of 
hours not worked – is not followed by significant responses on the number of hours worked, due to 
labor contract rigidities; the budget hyperplanes for periods before and after the shock may become 
further distant from each other, as only an income-effect is observed. On the other hand, fluctuations of 
the price of leisure can also increase the number of budget intersections, using the same logic discussed 
above,  provided  that  shifts  are  not  always  positive  or  negative.  The  issue  can  be  empirically 
investigated  with  simple  computations  of  how  often  budget  hyperplanes  do  intersect  within  both 
original datasets, as we also report in table 1.   
 
                                                 
14 Fleissig, Hall and Seater studied GARP consistency and weak separability of monthly data (not adjusting for sampling 
errors), along with quarterly and annual figures; they reported hundreds of GARP violations over their whole sample (1959-
1990); the largest subsample of GARP-consistent monthly data covered 20 years (1970:05-1990:12).     
15 We acknowledge that the exclusion of any good in the context of the GARP test is equivalent to assuming, a priori, that 
all other goods are weakly separable from it in the utility function. Nevertheless, we also performed our analysis over 
datasets without leisure because we are well aware of the criticism regarding the usual estimates of leisure prices and 
quantities.   11 
# of Budget Line Intersections
Quarterly Datasets: Sample Minimum Median Maximum Method 1 [Sit(1)] Method 2 [Sit(2)]
Q1: Leisure included (1964:I - 2000:IV) 117 145 147 100.0% 100.0%
Q2: Leisure excluded (1959:I - 2000:IV) 12 98 165 100.0% 100.0%
Annual Datasets: Sample Minimum Median Maximum Method 1 [Sit(1)] Method 2 [Sit(2)]
A1: Leisure included (1964 - 2000) 29 35 36 99.1% 78.8%
A2: Leisure excluded (1959 - 2000) 8 25 40 84.1% 68.4%
Note: Each of the last two columns shows percentage of times the null hypothesis was rejected in 2000 simulations of random data. 
Table 1 - The Power of GARP test using Bronars' (1987) algorithms 
Rejecting H0 (GARP consistency) 
 
 
As we inspect first the results for quarterly data (Q1 and Q2), the power of the GARP test against 
random behavior is – strikingly – the highest possible. Not even once (out of 2000 simulations) did the 
test fail to reject GARP over random data, regardless of data simulation methods or inclusion/exclusion 
of leisure. As for the number of times individual budget hyperplanes (for a given quarter) intersected 
with  the  ones  for  different  periods,  the  frequency  is  also  surprisingly  high  with  and  without  the 
inclusion of leisure, but more so with it. Even without the inclusion of leisure, however, the median 
number of times a given budget “line” intersects with others is very large, around 60% of the possible 
number of times. Those results seem to corroborate the high power of the test over datasets with often 
intersecting hyperplanes. 
 
The GARP-test results with annual data indicate that its power is indeed reduced within low-frequency 
datasets. Once more, the inclusion of leisure tended to raise the power of the test against the alternative 
hypotheses: the rejection rates with A1 are larger than with A2 with both data simulation methods; such 
higher power is consistent with the fact that any given annual budget hyperplane is more likely to 
intersect with others in datasets that include leisure – the minimum number of budget intersections 
jumps from 8 out of 42 possible intersections to 29 out of 37, as leisure is included.  
 
As one compares the rejection rates for each of Bronars’ alternative hypotheses or irrationality models, 
the test is revealed to be much weaker against Sit(2); focusing solely on the first algorithm would lead 
one to believe that the test is very powerful with annual datasets, but it is so only against that very 
particular model of irrational behavior. This is just what can be considered a limitation of Bronars’ 
approach, as we discussed before. 
 
Next, table 2 reports estimates of the power of the test using all simulation algorithms considered 
previously (including once more the number of budget intersections observed in each dataset). The use 
of all five methods confirmed, to a large extent, the overall conclusions drawn from table 1: the power 
of the test is indeed very high within quarterly datasets, regardless of leisure inclusion or simulation 
methods. However, the test is revealed to be substantially weaker at the annual frequency against the 
majority of alternative hypotheses – than against Bronars’.  
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Burton (1994) Cox(1997) New Method
Datasets: Samples Sit(1) Sit(2) Sit(3) Sit(4) Sit(5)
Q1: Leisure included (1964:I - 2000:IV) 100.0% 100.0% 98.9% 96.9% 100.0%
Q2: Leisure excluded (1959:I - 2000:IV) 100.0% 100.0% 98.9% 96.5% 100.0%
A1: Leisure included (1964 - 2000) 99.1% 78.8% 6.7% 19.7% 90.5%
A2: Leisure excluded (1959 - 2000) 84.1% 68.4% 10.1% 28.0% 80.6%
Note: Each of the last 5 columns shows percentage of times the null hypothesis was rejected in 2000 simulations of random data. 
Table 2 - The Power of the GARP test against each alternative hypothesis  
Bronars (1987)
Rejecting H0: Data is GARP-Consistent
 
 
Randomly simulated quarterly datasets were rejected quite often, at least 96% of the times. Just like 
with Bronars’ simulation methods [Sit(1), Sit(2)], all 2000 quarterly datasets were rejected with the new 
algorithm [Sit(5)], but not when the other two alternative irrationality models were used [Sit(3), Sit(4)].  
 
Nevertheless, the discrepancy of findings from the three alternative irrationality models is more striking 
with  annual  data.  First,  notice  that  the  power  of  the  test  is  extremely  low  against  the  hypotheses 
suggested in Burton.(1994) and in Cox.(1997), with rejection rates for annual data below 30%. Second, 
the results from the use of Sit(3) and Sit(4) were also atypical with respect to the inclusion of leisure: 
only in those cases, the estimated power of the test fell when leisure was included. Finally, the new 
data simulation method Sit(5) led to rejection rates always lower than the numbers from Bronars’ first 
algorithm, Sit(1), but higher than the ones from his second method, Sit(2).    
 
The first two issues raised in the last paragraph can be addressed together, as they are pieces of the 
same puzzle: the test detected no GARP violations 70% or more of the times that random annual data 
were generated according to algorithms Sit(3) or Sit(4);  however, budget intersections still occurred 
quite often at that frequency – at least 8 times but typically more than 25 times (see table 1). The 
explanation for this puzzler issue is that randomness does not necessarily imply irrationality.  
 
The common characteristic of those two simulation methods [Sit(3), Sit(4)] is that they  are strictly 
limited by actually observed choices. Regardless if one is simply randomly rearranging budget shares 
along the sample period [Sit(4)] or drawing random points from ranges of extreme choices [Sit(3)], the 
simulated budget shares in those cases may never assume values substantially different from the actual 
(possibly rational) ones.  
 
Since actual budget shares for many of those goods lie along relatively narrow ranges of values, the 
chances of simulating data that are significantly different from the actual allocations of resources with 
both algorithms are simply too small. The introduction of leisure seems to expose further the caveats of 
simulations methods Sit(3) and Sit(4): the inclusion of leisure involves implicitly  assuming that  an 
outstandingly large budget share is allocated to a single good at all times. It necessarily makes narrower 
the observed ranges of budget shares of other goods, as they become relatively less significant. Note, 
for  example,  that  the  share  of  expenditures  on  food  (ND1)  ranges  from  14.7  to  26.0%  of  total 
expenditures if leisure is excluded, and only from 4.9 to 5.4 with it. Therefore, a plausible explanation 
for the puzzle is the referred simulation methods have merely failed to generate irrational data.   13 
 
As for the issue of the estimated power of the test being so lower with Bronars’ second algorithm than 
with his first, apparently Sit(2) generates data that are, on average, consistent with GARP. Simulated 
budget  shares  for  each  good  “fluctuate”  around  their  historical  average,  equivalently  to  the  ones 
possibly derived from a Cobb-Douglas utility function with some sort of random errors.  
 
The new simulation method seem to have produced figures that are neither far too “extreme” as in 
Bronars’ Sit(1) nor so likely close – in small samples – to those of a rational consumer. Sit(5) seems to 
be a reasonable alternative for it preserves both the “irrationality” of random budget shares that are not 
bounded inside narrow intervals – a deficiency of Sit(3) and Sit(4) under certain circumstances – an the 




5-Final remarks and conclusions 
 
In this paper we discussed circumstances under which Bronars’ (1987) simulation algorithms may lead 
to biased conclusions about the power of the GARP-test, which verifies the existence of well-behaved 
utility functions rationalizing particular sets of personal consumption data. The original algorithm and 
some alternative ones generate random data that are either too extremely unreasonable (overestimating 
the power of the test) or much likely GARP-consistent ones (underestimating the power of the test). A 
trivial  adjustment  to  Bronars’  original  algorithm  was  proposed  and  applied,  so  as  to  incorporate 
information about the evolution of observed budget shares along the sample and, therefore, reduce the 
likelihood of the mentioned biases. More extensive use of Monte Carlo experiments seems to be a 
promising next step, in the attempt to establish the superiority of any of those algorithms, though – a 
direction for future research. 
 
We also confirmed that the power of Varian’s nonparametric test against alternative hypotheses of 
random behavior tends to be substantially lower as one adopts annual rather than quarterly per capita 
consumption data. In other words, the test was much more likely to commit a type II error and accept 
the utility maximizing hypothesis with annual random data than with quarterly figures.  
 
The low power of the test within annual datasets is an important result by itself, but it also provides a 
simpler  explanation  than  Swofford  and  Whitney’s  (1987,  1988)  for  the  nonrejection  of  GARP-
consistency on annual datasets that included broad monetary aggregates (Money-in-Utility Function 
models); they argued that the existence of short-run costs to adjust illiquid asset holdings could explain 
the occurrence of GARP violations within quarterly but not annual datasets. That is, indeed, possible, 
but our new explanation based on the power of the GARP test has the advantage of not relying on 
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